JAPANESE MILITARISM IN EARLY COLONIAL TAIWAN: TWO DISSIDENTS MUTED – THE TAKANO AND ISAWA CASES[1]

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Through the examination of Taiwan's early colonial administration and the Isawa and Takano study cases, we will clarify the nature and purposes of the colony's acquisition. In addition, we will be able to disperse the outdated economy-centered and demographic theories that many historians espoused to explain Japan's drive for colonies. This study, through an examination of secondary and primary sources, makes a contribution to colonial studies. Thus, the aim of this paper is to fill the gap and enrich the content, context, and the general understanding of the dynamics and events of the Age of New Imperialism and beyond.

Keywords: Meiji Japan, colonial Taiwan, militarism, Japanese colonialism

1. Aim and scope

A distinctive trait of Japan's expansionism in its earliest stage is the fact that it ran contrary to what Lenin defined as the highest stage of capitalism; Japanese history expert Jon Holliday defined Japan's expansion as "imperialism without capital" (Ching 2001, 10). Given Japan's undeveloped capitalism in the late 19th century, it appears that the imperialistic expansion was fueled more on ideology, psychology, or strategic considerations than on capital. Hobson suggests that the existence of excess capital leads to seeking profits overseas. However, during this period Japan had no excess capital, ran a significant trade deficit, and, following the annexation of Taiwan, even had to borrow large amounts from Britain and the United States to finance its industrial expansion. In a sense, Japan exported its

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underdevelopment in its colonies. Lenin's theory of imperialism advocates that the capitalists wanted to employ surplus capital abroad to achieve higher profits than in the domestic market. This does not appear to apply to Imperial Japan, which throughout this period had been tormented by a lack of sufficient arable land and raw material alike (Penfield 1905, 667–669).

Japanese imperialism is often characterized as "self-defensive" or "petty" imperialism. This theory of petty imperialism was first expressed by the economic analyst Takahashi Kamekichi in 1927 to prove the qualitative difference between the advanced capitalist states like Britain or Germany and Japan (Hoston 1984, 10–18). Japanese imperialistic aggression in the 19th century was generated under immature capitalistic economic conditions. At the time, the Japanese economy was mainly based on agricultural production while the production systems were semi-feudal (Lee 1994, 99). Kamekichi argues that Japan's expansion was in response to external circumstances and cannot be explained simply by the needs or demands of the capitalistic class.

The Marxist scholar Inomata Tsunao describes 19th century Japan as a developing country, which had not yet reached the stage of finance capital but had adopted imperialist policies as a reaction to western penetration in Asia (Duus 1995, 434). O. Tanin and E. Yohan, authors of the work *Militarism and Fascism in Japan* (1934) state that until the Russo-Japanese War, Japanese imperialism was not a product of finance capital since the solid foundation of large-scale industry was absent and Japan's domestic market was underdeveloped (Townsend 2000, 78–79). Illustrious historians such as Mark Peattie and Hilary Conroy agree that economic factors were not decisive in the shaping of Japan's early expansion. Failure to reach the stage of monopoly capitalism meant that Japan in the late 19th century was in "an earlier stage of imperialism," and Japan's imperialism was "a non-imperialist nation's practice of imperialism" (Ching 2001, 23–24).

Putting the widespread (and probably most prominent) economic "justification" of imperialism aside, we should look for the answer in another direction. Historians had argued that both Meiji Japan and Imperial Germany pursued a reactionary, authoritarian modernization that led eventually to totalitarianism. Even though this statement holds some validity for the 20th century, we are yet to fully comprehend and reach a consensus upon the nature of Japan's expansionism in the last quarter of the 19th century. It could be argued that the latecomers' imperial expansion was both preemptive and reactionary to the powers' colonialism. Numerous scholars of German expansion identified in 19th century colonial endeavors an effort by the metropole to resolve their demographic-migration and internal stability problems (Smith 1974, 641–643). But how can early Japanese colonial rule be defined: Commercial, Demographic, Militaristic, Strategic, Assimilationist, or perhaps a combination of these? Japan's geographic and cultural

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affinity with its subject peoples makes the phenomenon atypical but which theories (dependency, mimicry, underdevelopment, reaction to external factors, etc.) better sums up its imperial expansion? Through the analysis of two characteristic study cases and early colonial Taiwan's administration this study contributes to the field of colonial/postcolonial studies; the critical re-examination of the nature and origins of early Japanese colonialism can hopefully lead us to an innovative evaluation of Asian politics and the human condition.

The cases of Takano Takenori (1854–1919) and Isawa Shūji (1851–1917) are the more illustrative of Japan's (early) rule in its first *gaichi* (外地, "outer colony"). Both hailing from the civil administration sector in *naichi* (内地, "mainland Japan"), they experienced the ruthlessness and irrationality of the colonial regime's methods first-hand. Their testimonials and views hold relatively more value than the usual biased eulogies as recorded by the supporters and members of Japan's military establishment. They can also provide an objective and unprecedented glimpse on Taiwan's actual conditions. The eternal struggle between the political and the military element in the colony and the prevalence of the latter over the former would prove the fundamental weaknesses of Japan's colonial system. The establishment tried and succeeded in silencing their voices. The examination of judge Takano's and pedagogue Isawa's cases may appear as local histories, but they touch upon broader debates on colonial capitalism, settler colonialism, exploitation, and oppression.

2. Introduction

Japan after the Restoration of 1868 was a poor, backward, semi–feudal, and fragile country. The Boshin civil war of 1868–1869 and the signing of the unequal treaties rendered the nation even more vulnerable amidst the frenetic international competition for concessions and economic privileges. Western domination was not an unfounded fear in a country dubbed by historians as "semi-colonized." The country's economy would be controlled by foreign financiers for decades to come, and the government's decisions were often susceptible to western pressures (Bradshaw 1992, 115). For these reasons, but probably even prior to 1868, a reactionary siege mentality developed among the Meiji leaders and commoners alike. Tōkyō, in the midst of its modernization and westernization program, as a measure to counter the external threat and safeguard the nation's survival, always had its gaze fixed on the mainland. The late-19th century Japanese perceived themselves as the underprivileged latecomers who had to catch up with other contenders in the imperialistic arena. Suffering from limited resources the newborn state could not afford the luxury of distant and thus costly colonies in the European paradigm (Asano 2004, 54). Just five years after the Meiji Restoration the government was

split over the debate about Korea's possible invasion (征韓論 *seikanron*), the nation's closest neighbor. Remarkably, the following year an overseas colonial expedition was actually undertaken to capture Taiwan; it only failed because of western and Chinese reactions (Mayo 1972, 801–809).

Before expanding abroad, however, the new leadership had to solidify its rule and authority in the Japanese archipelago. Initially the main Japanese islands were brought under submission (the Boshin War) and were ruled almost despotically by the Chōshū and Satsuma (i.e., Satchō) leaders that came to dominate the Meiji government after their victory over the old regime. Clans were relocated or exterminated, people were taught the standard national language and made into loyal subjects and the entire nation suddenly acquired a common identity (internal colonialism) after centuries of division (Ikegami 1995, 196). The pre-modern colonies of Hokkaidō (1869) and Ryūkyū (1879) were incorporated next and secured in the face of foreign penetration. Strategic considerations about the safety of the nation spurred Tōkyō towards controlling, absorbing or reforming Taiwan (1895) and Korea (1910) (Conroy 1955, 821). For historians Wu Rwei-Ren and Donald Calman, this is a typical example of the core/periphery model (dependency theory) and the "transfer of oppression" doctrine. In this light, one can argue that eastern Japan and Hokkaidō were subjugated, economically exploited, and assimilated by the new Meiji government which was composed mainly by men from Chōshū and Satsuma in South-Western Japan. The Japanese people were the first targets of the government's colonizing-civilizing mission even before they began colonizing foreign peoples. First the rest of Japan, then the peripheral territories of Hokkaidō and the Ryūkyū to check the Russian and Chinese aspirations, and later on, other territories as beachheads for further expansion. This hierarchical relation of ruler and subordinate can be traced back to Japan's traditional social structure (Rwei-Ren 2003, 72–73). Calman goes a step further in asserting that Satchō systematically wiped out the opposition and promoted solely the political and commercial interests of their clan members and protégés in parts of Japan and Asia. According to Calman, this clique carried out ruthlessly a meticulously outlined plan of colonial domination, firstly by subjugating their fellow countrymen, then by exploiting Japan's periphery and lastly by advocating a plan of world conquest that led to the Second World War (Calman 1992, 244).

As a result of its victory over China, Japan occupied Taiwan from 1895 to 1945. The lack of preparation on how to rule Taiwan demonstrates that the seizure of the island was more occasional and opportunistic than deliberate. The annexation was a result of the sweeping victory over China and the jingoistic response of the public, which encouraged territorial expansion. Both the Meiji leaders and the ecstatic public agreed that Japan should be rewarded for its sacrifices with territorial compensation at China's expense, as the other Powers had done. Liaodong's

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retrocession meant that at the very least Taiwan had to be held at any cost. Interests, calculations and aspirations by individuals and pressure groups alike, albeit conflicting at times, brought about Japan's first colony. While now it is easy to disprove the demographic or economic justification of Japan's early expansion, we should not neglect that similar ideas were held and popularized by members of the ruling classes in the late 19th century. The complexity of the phenomenon in question is highlighted by the plethora and disparity of different views on the purpose and administration of Taiwan, expressed by cabinet members, foreign experts, and the omnipresent military. Navy officers were perhaps the only ones to deem the island as essential for the nation's future security (Beasley 1987, 56–58).

In the hands of another power, Taiwan would endanger Japan's position in the Far East and shatter its ambition to expand commercially and politically in the South (Roy 2013, 32). In this sense, early Japanese colonialism was reactionary, a mere precautionary measure to counter the forthcoming western encroachment. Prime Minister Itō Hirobumi (1841–1909) was convinced and pressed to annex Taiwan in the Shimonoseki peace talks. On May 10, 1895, he appointed Admiral Kabayama Sukenori (1837–1922) as the first Governor-General in Japan's colonial history. This study will argue that it was predominantly the search for strategic safety, militarism/authoritarianism, and the struggle for equality rather than economic or demographic concerns that led to the decision to annex the island regardless of the subsequent reasoning that was in line with New Imperialism's oratory (Peattie 1984, 82).

3. The initial confusion in ruling Taiwan

Despite the inhabitants' unexpectedly hostile disposition, the Japanese finally had placed Taiwan under their control. The Taiwan Affairs Bureau (台湾事務局 Taiwan Jimukyoku) set up by Prime Minister Itō on June 13, 1895 (Law No. 74) in Tōkyō to supervise Taiwan was abolished the following year. Itō Miyoji (Chief Cabinet Clerk), Kawakami Sorōku (Vice Chief of Staff), Kodama Gentarō (Vice Army Minister), Yamamoto Gonnohyōe (Vice Navy Minister), Hara Kei Takeshi (Vice Foreign Minister), Suematsu Kenchō (Chief of Legislation Bureau), Tajiri Inajirō (Vice Finance Minister), Den Kenjirō (Chief of Communications Bureau of the Ministry of Communications and Transportation), and the Prime Minister constituted the Bureau. These Ministers and agents lacking colonial experience could not agree on the status of Taiwan; was it to be ruled as a foreign territory or as a special province like Okinawa and Hokkaidō where assimilation (同化 *dōka*) was the state's main policy? William Montague Kirkwood (1850–1926) proposed the British model of "association" whereas the French jurist Michel Revon (1867–1947) stood for assimilation, illustrating the conflicting colonial methods of their re-

spective nations. The British and Dutch models were based on indirect rule and the principle of racial apartheid. The French model's assimilation was costlier but the coveted Japanization of the inhabitants would ensure Taiwan's possession in the long run (Matsuzaki 2011, 53–54).

Kirkwood in his "Opinion paper on the issue of the Taiwan system" submitted on April 30, 1895 to the Ministry of Justice proposed the treatment of Taiwan as a crown colony, as a distinct legal entity institutionally distinct from mainland Japan (Asano 2004, 37–38). The only common ground with Japan proper would be the subordination to imperial rule rather than to the constitution. In July 1895, he further declared:

> The institutions of Taiwan should be decided by the prerogatives of the emperor without the legislative review of the Imperial Diet. It is a legitimate constitutional action. The review of the Imperial Diet is required only when the budget of Taiwan is to be appropriated from the imperial treasury. (Chang 2003, 172–173)

Revon, influenced by France's colonial rationale, believed that Taiwan could be gradually integrated and assimilated to the conqueror's political and cultural sphere. On April 22, 1895, he stated that Japan "should assimilate [Formosa and the Pescadores] as fully as possible, and therefore, [Japan] must plan on making the islands a prefecture of the empire in the future, if not now." Large waves of Japanese immigrants and the imposition of the mainland's legal codes were steps towards assimilation. In order to prevent confusion and unrest in these first crucial steps Japanese civil law should be implemented gradually for the time being. In the future and when Taiwan was completely pacified its judicial integration to Japan's system could be more safely attempted (Asano 2004, 37). In the same manner, initial administration should enjoy some liberty of action but in the long run the island had to be transformed into a "true prefecture" under the government's direct jurisdiction. The pattern of gradual assimilation had precedents in French Africa; it also took place in Hokkaidō (1869) and Okinawa (1879) after their annexation. They were both considered backward territories populated by savages as was the case of Taiwan.

The liberal politician Hara Takeshi (1856–1921) as member of the Taiwan Affairs Bureau evaluated the suggestions of the two foreign advisors. On February 2, 1896, he decided that "Taiwan may have a system slightly different from the mainland, but will not be considered to belong to the colonial type." His ideas included a gradual implementation of the mainland's laws, legal and political incorporation into the Japanese structure, assimilation (内地延長主義 *naichi enchō shugi*, "doctrine of homeland extension") and administration directly accountable to Tōkyō instead to a colonial structure in Taiwan (Taiwan's tax affairs, military, and communications would be regulated by the respective ministries in Japan).

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The last recommendation divided the members of the Taiwan Affairs Bureau. Many found it impractical and costly. Being a native of Japan's northeastern area (Tōhoku), the region that supported the shogunate and had been defeated, Hara had little chance of winning over the Satsuma, Chōshū, Tosa, and Hizen clique that dominated the Meiji government and military after the Restoration. Clan nepotism was partially responsible for the rejection of Hara's proposals (Oguma 2017, 98). Hara retorted that to treat Taiwan as a colony would bring about inconsistency in the metropole's legislation and could provoke diplomatic problems with the foreign countries (Nomura 2010, 69). As for his assimilation strategy he justified it by calling attention to the geographic proximity and racial affiliation between Japan and Taiwan.

The fear of Western intervention partially prompted Hara and many of the Japanese elite to support the position of assimilation. Direct implementation of the mainland's laws in Taiwan would prove Japan's sovereignty over the island. The American legal advisor to the Foreign Ministry Henry Willard Denison (1846–1914) believed that Japan should not incorporate conquered peoples into the nation or grant them citizenship rights (Caprio 2009, 72). Denison came up with a discriminatory legal system based on the individuals' ethnicity as a solution. Westerners and Japanese in Taiwan were to be subjected to modern civil, commercial, and criminal codes, while the locals would be permitted to follow their own customs for the time being (Asano 2008, 106). The application of Ordinance No. 8 of June 23, 1898, which wholly embraced Denison's recommendation, reveals a lot about the nature of Japan's early colonial rule (Matsuzaki 2011, 60–62).

4. The colony's early administration

The Organic Regulations of the Government of the Governor-General of Formosa (台湾総督府 Taiwan Sōtokufu), of November or December 1895, set up the colony's administration. The Governor-General, as in the French, German, and British cases, was responsible to the Ministry of Colonial Affairs, established by imperial Ordinance 87 in 1896 after the abolition of the Taiwan Affairs Bureau. 16 months later the Ministry was also abolished, and its functions were transferred to the new Taiwan Affairs Bureau under the Prime Minister (Law No. 295). The Bureau was transformed into an office of the Home Affairs Ministry in February 1898 (Law No. 24). In October, it was again abolished, and Taiwan was placed under the direct supervision of the Home Affairs Ministry (Law No. 259) (Asami 1924, 13–14). The government consisted of the Governor-General's Secretariat, the department of Civil Affairs or Civil Administration Department (民生部 Minseibu), the Army Department and the Naval staff all under the Governor-General's authority. The Governor of Civil Affairs supervised the administration and finances

in Taiwan (PCE–FMC 1909, 24–26). Through several minor departments he controlled the colony's finance, education, communication, commerce and industry, public works, railways, monopolies, customs, surveys, and general affairs. The last branch was subdivided into four offices: domestic affairs, foreign affairs, legislation, and education (Hishida 1907, 269). The Army Department was made up by the General Staff, the Administrative Staff, the Judicial Section, the Commissariat Corps, the Medical Corps, and the Veterinary Corps. The Naval Staff was subdivided to the Chief Staff Officer, Administrative Staff Officer, and the Naval Interpreters (PCE-FMC 1909, 11).

The Governor-General was given the rank of *shinmin* (臣民) the highest of the four bureaucratic grades in Japanese officialdom. In this way, they enjoyed the same privileges of protocol as the Prime and Cabinet Ministers and the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court in Tōkyō. They came from the military; the ranks of general, admiral, lieutenant general, and vice–admiral were eligible for the post. Hara Takashi pushed in vain for civilian administrators under the direct supervision of the central government instead. A military oriented colonial administration meant that army leaders would have a bigger say in Taiwan than the Diet in Tōkyō. The uprisings and the continued local guerrilla warfare in the island, however, seemed to justify the successive appointments of Government-General from the ranks of the military from 1895 to 1919 when the system was abolished. Historian Atsushi Yamada argues that in fact the army had dominated the colony until 1919 (Yamada 2009, 43) This study will examine the activities of the first four Governor-Generals: Admiral Kabayama Sukenori (May 10, 1895–June 2, 1896), Lieutenant General Katsura Tarō (June 2, 1896–October 14, 1896), Lieutenant General Nogi Maresuke (October 14, 1896–February 26, 1898), and Lieutenant General Kodama Gentarō (February 26, 1898–April 11, 1906) (Chen 1970, 127–128). If we exclude Kodama, the average length of tenure was two years and one month, too short to gain a deep knowledge of the island's conditions (Grajdanzev 1942, 161).

The Governor-Generals were given almost unlimited powers in ruling the colony in order to pacify it. For some members of the Diet this semi-independent dictatorship was an emergency and a temporary measure (Komagome and Mangan 1997, 311). In this sense Japan's rule in Taiwan can be described as bureaucratic and militaristic. The Governor-Generals had the command of the colonial garrison. Furthermore, they had the authority to "control general political affairs;" to "control officials under [them];" to "command the military and naval forces;" and the right to issue executive ordinances carrying the same effect as the laws of Japan. As *shinmin* they answered directly to the Emperor for their colonial and administration policies (Yamada 2008, 43). The Imperial Ordinances No. 86 and No. 9, of 1896 and 1897, respectively, somewhat limited their authority. Taiwan's Governor-General held the power to cancel any decision of the provincial gov-

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ernors and dismiss or appoint officials of the lowest rank. If he was able to obtain imperial approval, he could even impose penalties upon the higher-level bureaucrats according to Article 4 Paragraph 1 of the 1897 Law (Chen 1970, 134).

The broad legislative powers, mainly in the form of the *ritsurei* (律令, "decrees as laws") ordinances, entrusted to the Governor-General to maintain social order after Taiwan's occupation were challenged by the Diet. The Diet was the only law-making institution in accordance with the Japanese constitution of 1889. The Meiji Constitution did not contain any provisions regarding colonial annexations in the empire. The inland's political condition, the population's hostility, and the notion that Taiwan's traditions and customs were completely different from those prevailing in Japan brought about the Governor-General's investment with extraordinary powers (Barclay 2018, 91–92). In March 1896, Law No. 63 was approved by the Diet with the provision that its enactment would be a temporary measure; its duration was set for three years (Komagome 1996, 33). Therefore, the Diet's legislative powers were bypassed, and the constitution was only partially applied (Oguma 2017, 108); some Japanese laws would be selected and imposed. Law 63 was put in effect again in 1899, 1902, and 1905 despite the liberals' objections on the constitutionality of the proposed legislation. The liberal parliamentarian Takata Sanae (1860–1938) was among those deputies who objected. Mizuno Jun (1851–1900), Taiwan's first Governor of Civil Affairs from 1895 to 1897, replied in the Lower House:

> The entire Constitution cannot be applied in Formosa. On the contrary, the Government proposes to exercise sovereignty as far as possible on the basis of the Imperial prerogative. (Asano 2004, 39)

The government was unwilling to discuss further the law's constitutionality and in later years pointed out that the law has already passed and was now a legal precedent (Asano 2004, 39). In 1897, the scholar Ume Kenjirō (1860–1910) proposed that the rights of the Japanese citizens should be extended to the Taiwanese as well, because imperial rule was based on impartiality and justice (Komagome and Mangan 1997, 312). Law professors and constitutionalists such as Hozumi Yatsuka (1860–1912) argued that the constitution should be enforced in its fullest in Taiwan whereas others like Mitsue Ichimura (1875–1928) were against its application. Finally, the scholar Tatsukichi Minobe (1873–1948) proposed the constitution's partial implementation (Asami 1924, 32). The controversial Law 63 was eventually superseded by Law 31 in 1906.

5. Military over civilian rule

Due to the prolonged resistance, the Governor-General and his staff were granted in 1896 considerable authority. Thus, they proceed unhindered in imposing

a military and not a civilian rule in the colony. Every Governor-General who was by definition closely associated with the ranks of the army did not feel that he had to conform to Tōkyō's directives. Concurrent implementation of assimilationist and "differentiation" policies resulted in a complicated and contradictory legal framework for the island's inhabitants (Yamamoto 1942, 3). Prime Minister Itō Hirobumi's plan on May 21, 1895 intended to place the Governor-General's authority under the planned Taiwan Affairs Bureau. Furthermore, Hara's pleads for a civilian Governor-General's were vetoed by the Vice Chief of Staff, Kawakami Sōroku on the grounds that the army needed freedom of action to suppress the rebels. The Army and the Navy Ministers had the power to bring down the government if one of them decided to resign; according to the law these posts had to be filled by active officers. The promulgation of Law 63 was a field of power struggle and a victory of the military at the expense of the civil administration and the Diet. In Japan, where the military had a preponderant political status and an overbearing influence upon society, the Governor-General and his associates hailing from the army were immune to possible criticism and pressures by the liberal deputies in the Diet (Haruyama 1980, 39). Ranking army and navy officers in the colony saw the Governor-Generals as patrons and colleagues. These close relations meant that the military held many of the offices of the colonial government and exerted great influence over domestic matters.

Every Governor-General vigorously guarded his autonomy in Taiwan. From 1896 to 1915 the post was occupied strictly by Chōshū men. The General Staff saw Taiwan as its private outpost, as a great opportunity to act without civilian restrictions and implement its belligerent and expansionist aims. For the Navy and other government members the island's pacification and transformation into a military foothold was the first step towards the subjugation of South China and the South Seas (南進論 *Nanshinron*) (Matsuzaki, 72–73). Other members of the armed forces favored the northern advance (北進論 *Hokushinron*) but had to content themselves with Taiwan for the time being; it would take another decade for Japan to acquire a second colony to potentially transform into a military stronghold for further advance. In 1895, any expansion was welcome but unplanned; since Taiwan happened to come under Japanese rule first, the government delved into a policy of expansion towards the South.

Despite the declaration of civil rule on the island in March 1896, its administration remained preponderantly military oriented for years to come (Kublin 1973, 319). The colony was practically under constant martial law. Until 1898, when competent colonial magistrates took over, no sound administrative base or long-term civil policies were formed and even then, the military's role was prevalent. Despite the implementation of more reasonable approaches to governing Taiwan, Japan's rule remained militaristic and tyrannical. The first infrastructural works

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on the island, during Kodama's tenure, were not meant and did not improve the inhabitants' daily life; if anything, they tightened the rulers' grip (Ts'ai Hui-yu 2009, 124–126). Tōkyō was still faced with the stubborn rebels (the last pacification campaign took place in the 1910s), financial limitations, and the unsettling watchful eye of the westerners, and struggled to retain control after 1895 as well. After years of continuous insurrection, scandals, and rapid turnover of incompetent Governor-Generals, Japan's immature colonial experiment in Taiwan seemed destined to fail (McLaren 1965, 243–249).

6. Military law is the only law: the Takano case

The Governor-General also had the power to establish or abolish courts in the colony and to appoint or dismiss public persecutors and judges. He also had the authority to suspend a judge or reduce his salary considerably. Thus, the judiciary was silenced and subordinated to the executive. The actual administration of the law was in the Governor of Civil Affairs' hands. In May 1896, a Supreme Court (高等法院 *kōto hōin*) and a court of appeals were set up in the capital Taihoku, the seat of the colonial government. This measure was followed by the establishment of local courts in 15 districts, each one equipped with public persecutors. No channels of appeal to the Supreme Court in Tōkyō were made available. The court system employed in Taiwan had nothing to do with the one in metropolitan Japan. In line with the *ritsurei* 16 issued on July 19, 1898, three district courts (地方法院 *chihō hōin*) and a court of appeals (覆審法院 *fukushin hōin*) were inaugurated in Taiwan. The latter had a civil and criminal division each presided by three judges. The district courts were also divided to civil and criminal branches and had the competence to examine preliminarily criminal cases. In the first 20 years of the Japanese occupation the colonial government, facing budgetary limitations, did not appoint many legal professionals and did not spend funds to bolster Taiwan's judiciary (Hishida 1907, 270).

The case of the First Chief Justice of the High Court of Taiwan, Takenori Takano, is enlightening. Takano conducted a prosecution involving high officials in the colonial administration under suspicion of corruption. He also criticized the military police's cruel methods. Governor-General Nogi, willing to silence any scandalous rumors and considering Takano's actions as civilian meddling in his rule, attempted to oust him. Takano was recalled to Tōkyō where some cabinet Ministers tried to convince him to desist from his investigation. When he declined, they ordered him to retire in October 1897. Takano claimed that he was free from executive interference under Article 58 of the constitution which states that judges were immune to dismissal or involuntary transfer (Asano 2004, 42). But, his removal was explained on the grounds that Taiwanese courts were

not ordinary courts and in any case, they were outside of the constitution's area of jurisdiction. Takano rejected their bidding as illegal and returned to his post in the colony (Chen 1970, 140). The day before the corruption case was to be tried, 16 police officers and constables arrested him in the courthouse. The majority of the judges in Taiwan supported him but could not overrule Tōkyō's and the colonial government's decision. The application of the constitution to Taiwan became again a heated debate in Prime Minister Matsukata Masayoshi's (1835–1924) cabinet. In July 1897, the colony's Supreme Court was temporarily abolished. The opposition and some cabinet members supported Takano's case and harshly attacked the government in December. Matsukata resigned in January 1898. Takano asked the next Prime Ministers Ōkuma and Itō for his moral exoneration and he further appealed to various courts, but in vain (Kim 2012, 163).

The first colonial laws were nothing more than punishments copied from the military code of justice for the rebels. Military tribunals with extraordinary authorities were hastily established (Asano 2004, 41); the first was set up in November 1895 in line with the Regulation regarding the Organization of the Taiwan Governor-General Courts. According to the Dispositions for Taiwanese Military Criminals the penalty was always death. Few "insurgents" were actually put to trial; most of them were hurriedly executed. Only 41 out of 345 criminal cases in the tribunal involved the offense of rebellious activities between November 1895 and March 31, 1896. The Penalty Order for Inhabitants of Taiwan (Ordinance No. 4) made the provisions of the army and navy criminal law during wartime applicable to cases of homicide, rape, and robbery without the right of appeal. It was succeeded by the 1898 Bandit Punishment Law, a particularly harsh law whose aim was to terrorize the "bandits" into submission. Takano demonstrated sympathy for the guerrilla fighters; many of them were not prosecuted during his tenure in 1896–1897. In 1897, district courts imposed death on only 54 out of 526 rebel cases. The police were so corrupted that its members exhorted money from the Taiwanese in order to not charge them with made up crimes. The official report entitled "Actual conditions in Taiwan" presented some time in 1896 to Prime Minister Matsukata admitted that the Japanese military:

> violently abused the native inhabitants, struck them without reason, forced them to sell their goods at a low price; or, in the name of requisition, seized their goods, occupied their houses and ancestral halls; or arbitrarily suspecting them (of some crime), arrested natives and slaughtered them. (Oguma 2017, 44)

Destruction of temples and schools, excavation of tombs, disdain of local customs was not a part of an assimilation policy but random violence (Oguma 2017, 44). Early in 1897, Chief Justice Takano accused the Japanese police of arresting

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and torturing inhabitants arbitrarily. No civil law was applied until July 1898 (*ritsurei* no. 8 of 1898 enforced the Civil, Commercial, and Criminal Law) (Wang 2000, 106).

Due to the absence of a Chinese central administration, the Taiwanese were accustomed to solving their differences by themselves. In 1899, trials in Taiwan were aligned to the Japanese penal codes that in turn were adopted from the Western-style legal systems. In this sense, the modernization of the Japanese society in Western terms was duplicated on another "backward" Asian society that until then had been influenced by Chinese practices. Of course, not every aspect of enlightened legislation was put in practice; for example, suffrage only existed in the metropole and not in the colony. Conscription was not implemented as it would bring the untrustworthy Taiwanese into the ranks of the military (Oguma 2017, 63). The Meiji legislators believed that an outright application of Japan's Westernized legal system in Taiwan was not possible due to the island's particular conditions (Wang 2000, 146–149).

7. The Isawa case

The main tool to achieve assimilation was education (Gotō 1921, 114–116). Many Taiwanese that experienced the Japanese educational system wished to become imperial subjects and tried to behave as Japanese.[2] Tōkyō, however, despite the proclamations for equality, never considered them to be Japanese or to possess the rights of Japanese (King 2013, 13). Isawa Shūji was the first Chief of the Education Bureau (PCE–FMC 1916, 15–16) of the colony with the task of modernizing Taiwan's educational system between 1895 and 1898. Isawa reached the island on June 16, 1895, accompanying the first Governor-General; he submitted his first plan four days later (Howe, Lai, and Liou 2014, 101). Securing interpreters and translators was the first order of business (Komagome 1996, 43); the new colonial administrators and military authorities were unable to understand the local dialects and the island's inhabitants did not speak Japanese (Zagarola 1991, 267). Isawa founded the Japanese Language School in Taihoku in May 1896 and 14 elementary schools for the Taiwanese were built throughout the island during his first two years in office. In the next years, 19 more were built with the local districts covering the expenses which were paid by the local villages through taxes. In 1898, these schools were transformed into "public schools" (PCE-FMC 1916, 12). Isawa had the long-term goal of free universal elementary education in the colony (Tsurumi 1977, 42). Taiwanese children of all social classes were welcomed in his system. In October 1895, he declared:

[2] Many however resisted and sought to preserve their identity (Dawley 2019, 161–204).

> To make the people of Taiwan into Japanese we should not resort to military force. We are educators, and educators must instead expend immense energy and have the utmost dedication to their cause. (Heaton 2014, 52)

By 1898, Isawa had overseen the building of 76 common schools (Heaton 2014, 56–76). Among them, there were 16 Japanese language schools and 36 branch institutes. The curriculum's aim was to assimilate the ruled into Japanese culture; Japanese language was the main subject, replacing the study of Chinese and Confucian text. Isawa eventually accepted the teaching of Confucian texts to make the schools more appealing to the Taiwanese (Kleeman 2003, 131). Military oppression and the lack of Chinese classical education made the Taiwanese parents unwilling to trust their children's education to the new regime (Komagome and Mangan 1997, 314). Japanese textbooks promoted advancement and individual capabilities, but the ones taught to Taiwanese children promoted mostly loyalty, cooperation, and morality. They were also taught Japanese history as part of their own history. In an 1897 speech, Isawa claimed that Taiwan was Japanese territory in ancient times but it had been "taken by the Qing Dynasty." Geographically speaking, "Taiwan really constitutes one chain with our country and is almost naturally attached to our country" (Oguma 2017, 72). Further schooling was not encouraged and was limited to those students that had the potential to be teachers and doctors. Later, Gotō Shinpei, head of civilian affairs in Kodama's administration, instructed the teachers to not over-educate the Taiwanese; further instruction could be expensive but more importantly detrimental to Japan's long-term grip on the island (Tsurumi 1977, 23). Taiwanese students could study engineering, science, technology, and medicine, but the subjects of law, politics, and social sciences were forbidden for their allegedly disruptive potential (Hechter, Matesan, and Hale 2009, 49). Carefully selected Taiwanese students were permitted to continue their studies in Japan. The first arrived in Japan in November 1895 (Lamley 1964, 323).

In 1898, Isawa proposed to the Government-General the creation of more Japanese language schools, of elementary schools for Japanese children, and of more public schools for the Taiwanese. In that year, however, the Diet decreased the funds available for Taiwan by four million yen, or almost 30%. The civil administrator of Taiwan, Mizuno Jun, had decided in 1897 to spend the following fiscal year's budget on military and police build-up. Isawa found these investments counterproductive; for him education was a more efficient instrument than the army (Kleeman 2003, 131). In any case, Isawa's education-related projects were scarcely funded. He also learned that for the next fiscal year, the colonial government was inclined to increase investments on the colony's schools by only 100,000 yen. Isawa appealed to Governor-General Nogi to gain support for his plans that had been already approved by Tōkyō. When Nogi rejected his appeal

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Isawa resigned on July 29, 1898, and his plan for universal education faded away (Heaton 2014, 76).

The proclamations about civilizing the Taiwanese through education were shattered under the pressure and the preponderance of the military in the colony. Economy, legislation, and the relations between the colonizers and the subjugated in these first years of Japanese rule were not regulated in line with the patterns of modern civil administration. Every aspect of economic and social life in a military orientated colony was rather dominated by the needs and aspirations of the army. Every endeavor that was contrary to the military's goals and every dissident voice in the colony were ruthlessly muted and brushed aside. The authoritarian and bellicose character of early Japanese colonialism is easily perceivable through Taihoku's interaction with the island's inhabitants, both Chinese and aborigines. It was in that occasion that the façade of the enlightened, benevolent, and sympathetic ruler resonantly collapsed. For the army, administering the colony was a task too important to be entrusted to the Diet and the politicians. According to the "Chronicle of the Police Affairs of the Taiwan Governor-General's Office," the office at a certain point suggested the expulsion of the Taiwanese from the strategically important island so that loyal subjects from the Japanese Home Islands could populate the colony making it safer (Nomura 2010, 75–76).

8. Conclusion

Besides the "economic" interpretation of Japan's drive for colonies, many scholars argue that the phenomenon had a "demographic justification." The available statistics make evident that Taiwan was not able to accommodate Japan's surplus population as many imperial advocates had claimed before 1895. In 1905 the Japanese were only 57,309, less than 2% of the total population. 40% of them were self-employed or colonial officials, while 1,4% were employed in agriculture, fisheries, and forestry. In 1898, the Japanese permanently settled in Taiwan, besides the military forces, were 13,214 with 3,078 leaving that year. In 1899, the arrivals amounted to 20,743 while 7,903 returned to Japan. In 1900, 20,995 arrived and 8,842 left. The respective number for the next four years are: 17,841 and 14,054 for 1901; 13,821 and 11,478 for 1902; 15,892 and 13,149 for 1903; 11,564 and 12,155 for 1904 (Semple 1913, 273). The Japanese newspaper *The Kobe Chronicle* set the number of the Japanese houses in Taiwan in 1899 to 2,247. The total Japanese population in 1900 was 7,402 according to the editor (*The Kobe Chronicle*, vol. VI, no. 143, Wednesday March 28, 1900). Additionally, malaria and brigandage forced the majority of the aspiring colonists to return to Japan. Japanese immigrants, despite Tōkyō's promises and facilitations in Taiwan, kept flocking to Hawaii and North America (60,000 Japanese were living in Hawaii by 1900, whereas 27,500

left Japan for the US between 1890 and 1900) (Kawaguchi 1991, 344–345). In the early 1900s, hundreds of thousands of Japanese would work and reside overseas. In contrast, by 1911 only 231 Japanese agricultural families had settled in Taiwan (Davidson 1903, 594). From 1896, when the first civilians were permitted to enter the colony, and until 1942, the Japanese population of the island never exceeded 6% of the total population (Xiong 2014, 12–13).

Early Japanese rule's focus on assimilation collapses as a theory as well. The supposed goal of the assimilationist faction was to transform the peripheral peoples into Japanese (to make the colonized as similar as possible to the colonizers), before granting them the status of Japanese citizen just like it happened in Hokkaidō and the Ryūkyū islands (Komagome 1996, 58–59). It was deemed risky to grant citizenship rights lightly to peoples whose loyalty was problematic or else the metropole itself would be in danger of disintegration.[3] Japan was not a superpower. Its limited resources meant that realistic priorities and a gradualist approach had to define its incorporation of foreign territories. Thus, Japanese assimilation was based on the ethnocentric, militaristic, racist, and nationalistic conviction of the superiority of the Japanese spirit. For the colonial expert Yanaihara Tadao (1893–1961), assimilation was not the early administration's main policy. It was only a scheme to differentiate Japanese colonialism from its western counterparts and silence those in Taiwan and Japan that were calling for the colony's political autonomy. For the Japanese, the goal was the integration of the Taiwanese as (lesser) members in the Yamato family. In theory the whole population of the colonies, and not a few native elites, would be given equal rights at some point. Education, of the Japanese language that is, was the means by which assimilation would be accomplished (Furukawa 2007, 24). Ironically, the regime failed to support Isawa's educational plans, demonstrating its inconsistency and fixation with military rule.

How early Japanese colonialism compares with the more modern postcolonial interpretations of imperialism? The "underconsumption thesis" does not apply in our case since 19th century Japanese economy was in shortage not in excess of capital to be invested abroad. Dependency theory explains Japan's peripheral po-

[3] Political and administrative autonomy could prove fatal for Tōkyō's long-term grip over Taiwan. The Taiwanese, as the Ryūkyūans and the Ainu before them, had to be politically, spiritually, and culturally assimilated for the metropole's national security and well-being. On January 2, 1899, Hara wrote in favor of the assimilation doctrine and warned that "appeasement buys peace in the short term" but can be dangerous in the future. Isawa Shūji, Taiwan's Education Bureau Chief from 1895 until 1897, could not agree more: "In order to maintain order in a new territory, in addition to conquering it externally through force, it is necessary to conquer its spirit, dispel its old national dreams, and realize a new national spirit. In other words, it is necessary to pursue Japanization." Japanization would be achieved mainly through education as in the other two peripheral territories (Matsuzaki 2011, 63).

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sition and forceful introduction to the global capitalist network in the 19th century. However, Japan as the unique non-western nation to become an imperial power, swiftly transformed itself from periphery to core, from vulnerable subordinate to ambitious colonizer. For Paul A. Baran Japan flourished exactly because it had escaped Western domination, although this growth probably refers to the 20th century and does not apply in the context of the 19th century. Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher's scheme explains the phenomenon better despite having placed Britain and Europe at the center of their attention; it was international politics and strategic fears rather than financial calculations that carved up the African continent. Each western power had to be territorially compensated in the event of other colonial annexations in a diplomacy game which resembles the domino effect. Similarly, Yanaihara Tadao and Kamekichi Takahashi claimed that Japanese imperialism had more to do with Euro-American imperialist competition and less with the export of financial capital, the formation of monopolies, and overproduction. For them Japan's expansion was a product of and a reaction to external factors. Early Japanese colonialism can be partially explained by the Robinson-Gallagher thesis since the Meiji elites' drive for colonies was in part fueled by strategic considerations. Nevertheless, we have to remember that until the Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1902 the Powers did not show interest or willingness to collaborate or negotiate with a backward nation;[4] if Japan aspired to expand in Asia, this had to take place in the battlefield, without international support and against all odds (Wolfe 1997, 388–406).

Despite the proclamation regarding the establishment of a civil administration in Taiwan the muted voices of Takano and Isawa show the true nature of Japan's colonialism. It can be safely inferred that these two examples offer a rare glimpse on colonial Taiwan's painful reality. The militaristic nature of Japan's early (mis) management of Taiwan is clearly documented by Isawa's case. Takano's attests to the rapacious and atavistic side of his country's overseas rule as well but there is more; it is a proof that abuse, despotism, and injustice rose to new heights in colonial Taiwan and disperses any banal claim on Japanese benevolence and clemency. If a high-ranking Japanese official could be bullied into submission by the military establishment one can only sympathize with the harsh reality the average imperial Taiwanese subjects had to face.

[4] The imposition of the unequal treaties (especially the exterritoriality clause) stemmed from West's perception of Japan as barbarian in the 19th century. The Western world's disdain was an insult to Japanese honor which compelled the Meiji government to modernize itself following the Powers' example and to embrace their civilization. In their first colony, the Japanese did everything they could to project their cultural superiority and modernity in contrast to the Taiwanese backwardness (Auslin 2004, 25).

On a broader level Taiwan served as Japan's base of operations in the imperialistic field. The colony would act as a conduit through which Japan's military power and capital were to augment Tōkyō's interests and enable territorial expansion in south China and beyond (Chang and Myers 1963, 434). In the summer of 1896, while writing to Itō, Katsura added: "We must make Southern China, the Fukien zone, ours, and establish a close connection with Amoy" (Lone 2000, 41). He continues: "in political and trade terms, Amoy will be our most important point, serving as a new channel for our ways and goods. With this, we can nurse our possibilities in the Fujian region and be ready when opportunity appears" and "[w]e should hold matters in the north and push south, reaching out from the Japan Sea to the China Sea and all parts of the coast" (Lone 2000, 47). Kodama was of the same opinion. In his "Fourteen-point Memorandum on the Past and Future Administration of Taiwan of 1899," he stated: "In order to accomplish *nanshin* [南進, "southern expansion doctrine"] [...] we should make it our policy to gain a predominant commercial influence in South China and the South Seas" (Schencking 1999, 779).

In order to rapidly achieve their goal, project their possessions as pacified, profitable, and developed for reasons of prestige, the early colonial authorities marginalized any kind of civil administration since the 1898 proclamation of civil administration was more theoretical and real. Immediate results could be achieved by utilizing strict military rule and terror even during Kodama's and Gotō's tenure.[5] The Japanese urgency to appear as equal and successful colonizer explains their eagerness to silence any opposition at home and in their first colony. In both study cases we detect the prevalence of the military authority over civilian rule. Isawa's grievances and Takano's protests fell on deaf ears. Having to put up against the pro-military ruling classes and authorities at home and in the colony, they never had any chance of contributing in a meaningful way in Taiwan's administration no matter how noble their initial intentions might have been. Marginally improving the life of the Taiwanese, even in a colonial context, through education or the exercise of justice was a futile effort all along due to Tōkyō's priorities and goals.

Taiwan after its acquisition was destined to become military base where civil rights and dissident voices had no place. In fact, the colony was in constant state of war (against the aborigines and insurgents), under martial law, administered always by generals and admirals and serving the military's purposes and interests. The Governors pledged their loyalty to the military, almost ignoring the national parliaments. For the military officers serving in the colony the politicians from

[5] The courts during the Kodama's administration were harsher than their predecessors during the tenure of Takano. According to the new law almost all bandits were sentenced to death. As a result, in 1899 death sentences regarding cases of banditry increased to 60% and to 74,3% in 1902 (Zagarola 1991, 308).

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their comfortable seats of their assemblies in Tōkyō, utterly ignorant about the warlike conditions of this distant place, were not suitable to enact laws for Taiwan or administer it. Lacking the funds to set up an efficient judicial system, Taiwan's courts were initially entrusted to army officials. Special "temporary" courts were immediately organized (1895) not to provide a fair trial to any Taiwanese insurgent but to punish them as criminals. To Takano's frustration, Taihoku unsupervised and in haste, put to death and deported thousands of native troublemakers.[6]

Taiwan's administration was authoritarian and the governors ruled it despotically and virtually unrestrained as their personal fief. Japanese legislation (1895–1897) gave to Taiwan's Governor-General's considerable authority.[7] The never-ending state of war in the first colony provided the governors and thus the military with "urgent" and enlarged powers for years. During these periods, lawlessness, oppressive and abusive police action, coupled with human rights violations, scandals, mismanagement, confusion, and even mass murders systematically took place but were covered up to avoid international condemnation. According to author Paul Barclay, even the most lenient Japanese officials "believed that the indigenes were savages squatting on the emperor's land" (Barkley 2018, 46). That was the prominent rationale that Takano and Isawa had to put up with the moment they reached the colony.

In Taiwan, any interference by civilians in the colony's military establishment, such as the one made by judge Takenori Takano, was bluntly silenced (1897). Takano's criticism about the army using excessive force, extorting money, and intimidating civilians was suppressed by the colonial authorities. Similarly, Isawa Shūji condemned the Japanese soldiers' horrendous behavior in Taiwan's Confucian temples (Nomura 1999, 6). Spending the limited available funds on the colony's police and armed forces instead of on the education of the colonial sub-

6 Not only the local Taiwanese but even the Japanese soldiers stationed on the island revolted against their superiors at times proving that the island was a constant warzone. On November 30, 1900, privates of the fifth battalion of the third brigade mutinied and opened fire against their commanders at Shinyeisho. The Governor-General government tried to cover up the incident but it was evident that anarchy ruled over the colony. See "Soldiers' mutiny in Formosa," *The Kobe Chronicle*, vol. VIII, no. 183, Wednesday January 2, 1901, p. 15.

7 Two Japanese residents (Hagiwara and Kobayashi) travelled in 1902 to Tōkyō in order to reveal the island's real conditions. They lamented the perpetuation of the military law in Taiwan and the "despotic authority" of the colonial officials. The Governor-General was disregarding the needs of the Japanese inhabitants, deported dissidents, and promoted the interests of his clique. The Japanese, the Japanized Taiwanese, and the ordinary Taiwanese in the island did not enjoy any rights. Hagiwara and Kobayashi requested full rights and the right of representation at least for the first two categories; the colonial state's arbitrariness and abuse suffocated the colonizers and subordinated voices alike. See "The condition of Formosa, rights of residents, an interview with a deputation," *The Japan Chronicle*, no. 236, Wednesday January 8, 1902, p. 8.

jects prompted the first Chief of the Education Bureau, Isawa Shūji to resign in protest (1898). The island became a miniature police state as the result of the intensification of the *hokō* system (1898), brimming with prisons; the army and the police enjoyed great authority and manned the colonial administration *en masse*. One of the most heinous acts was the mass murder of 275 surrendered ex brigands on May 22, 1902 organized by the higher echelons of the colonial administration in their effort to "pacify" the locals. The same tactic was repeated six more times in different locations. Gotō's and Kodama's mafia like methods did not provoke a scandal, bring dishonor, or effect their resignation. The military approved these tactics while the Diet had not any say in the colony. Moreover, entire villages were set on fire and many Taiwanese, innocent or not, were murdered instantly by the occupation forces or sentenced to death as "brigands" after hasty and inept military tribunals.[8] In practice, awe and fear was employed in contrast to the rhetoric of the benevolent civilizing mission. On one occasion, more than 4,000 houses were burned to the ground in Yunlin (1896). The islands' aboriginal inhabitants also got to know Tōkyō's colonial brutality first by being under siege by a restrictive and armed guard line and in the 20th century by being the direct targets of the Japanese army's purges (Ōe 2001, 72–74).

The lack of funds as a result of the country's immature capitalism was evident at home and in its first colony as well. During the first years of colonial rule, investments were scant, private interest limited, and the authorities, having more urgent priorities, neglected the local populations. While the dominant state put forward a plan of industrialization and economic development at home, Taiwan was to remain underdeveloped. Nevertheless, the colony was a burden for state finances. During the first years at least, colonial administration was draining the national treasuries while the colony's trade deficit was a constant source of anxiety for the colonial policy makers (Hoston 1984, 18).

What is certain is that soon after the colonization of Taiwan, Japan sought to further expand. The nation did not simply annex this colony but engaged in bloody warfare to consolidate its presence. The Japanese had to fight almost immediately after establishing their presence in their first colony: initially against the Republic of Taiwan, later against the insurgents, and until 1915 against the island's indigenous population. It was from the new colony that the Japanese sought to expand commercially and politically in Southern China. The city of Amoy (modern day Xiamen), opposite to Taiwan, was targeted first and was captured briefly

[8] Following the Yunlin massacres Takano criticized the Japanese military and called for equal treatment for the Taiwanese: "The governance of Taiwan is a difficult enterprise beyond ordinary imagination [...]. We need to stop viewing the Taiwanese as people of a defeated country or slaves, but as the imperial subjects of the emperor. In other words, they should be treated the same as the people of Japan proper" (Chang 2003, 179).

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(August 1900) before the withdrawal of the Japanese troops in the face of foreign protests. The plan was orchestrated by the military (Katsura and Kodama) and the Japanese troops hailed from Taiwan amidst the raging Boxer Rebellion in China (Jensen 1951, 243–245). This bellicose, opportunistic, and failed attempt encapsulates perfectly the nature of early Japan's expansion.

The historian and journalist Tokutomi Sohō perceived Taiwan as a natural "footing for the expansion of Greater Japan" in the South even before the acquisition of the island:

> Taiwan is a strategic point, like Japan's south gate. If Japan intends to expand its territorial map of the Greater Japan Empire toward the south, there is no room for discussion about whether Japan has to go through this gate [...]. It is natural [...] to expand to the Strait of Malacca, the Indochinese and Malay Peninsulas and to the South Seas islands through this gate [...]. If we do not acquire it today, some other power will take it in the future. Taiwan is an easy prey in Asia. (Gotō 2014, 16–17)

Katsura claimed that "the areas in South China ought to become like the Korean Peninsula" and concluded that "it is not difficult to expand political and commercial strength to the South Seas in the future from the base of Taiwan" (Gotō 2014, 17). In this sense the financial loss for the mother country was deemed as secondary in comparison to the colony's future strategic value.

Although the veterans of the 1874 campaign never abandoned the dream of Japan's return to Taiwan, the island's occupation was more of an adventurist byproduct of the Sino-Japanese war and less the fruit of a long-term official strategy. Japan's focus on Taiwan was not constant. It was Korea rather than Taiwan that had dominated Meiji foreign policy for decades. This fact is verified by Japan's initial confusion in governing the island. Taiwanese resistance shook the invaders' confidence in their civilizing mission and transformed the project of a peaceful administration into a military campaign for years to come. Gotō admitted Tōkyō's unpreparedness: "The Japanese occupation of Taiwan was the unexpected result of the Sino-Japanese war. We were not yet prepared for any civilized colonial policy" (Chang 2003, 112–119). In 1900, at a conference of island administrators, Kodama presented his long-term goals:

> In order for us to acquire the power to oppose them [Western powers] so that we can continue to dominate in the Far East and pre–serve the peace, there is no other recourse open to us but to acquire more knowledge and increase our wealth. (Chang and Myers 1963, 436)

In late 1900 Japan had already undertaken a massive armament expansion for its future clash with Russia and its participation in the global colonial race; an unprofitable and unruly colony could not be tolerated (Barclay 2018, 96). Militarism,

industrialization, and colonialism were symbols of modernity; in the 19th century modernity was the ticket to higher status. Tōkyō decided to emulate these Western practices and policies. By occupying a colony, any colony, the Meiji elites tried to gain respect, recognition, and stature as a modern and civilized nation in order to be admitted as equals in the exclusive club of the Great Powers. The adoption of Western civilization went hand in hand with adoption of Western imperialistic practices. In other words, colonialism was not the result but a prerequisite in the path to modernization (Eskildsen 2002, 391–392).

The message was clear; Japan had to acquire more territories, exploit their resources, and challenge the strategic predominance of the other empires. Taiwan had to be developed agriculturally in order to supply food and raw materials to the mother country in this conflict; industrial development was reserved for the metropole alone. In the empire building process justice both in court and as a principal is rather a nuisance and a burden; this is how Takano was perceived by the regime. Similarly, Tōkyō was unwilling to give heed to a skilled pedagogue's grandiose and expensive plans for universal schooling. The Taiwanese were destined to become hard-working farmers and obedient subjects for Japan's sake. Furthermore, Takano's and Isawa's isolation or even removal unveiled the military establishment's conviction to proceed as planned. It was a symbolic gesture certifying that any civilian interference with the army's plans and methods would not be tolerated.

Acquiring Taiwan, and later Korea, seemed to complete the strategy of China's encirclement. Most of the funds from foreign debt following the acquisition of Taiwan went for military expenditure, and only 3% of the funds went for the development of Japan's colonies. Schumpeter's thesis appears to have validity in this case. According to him, imperialism represented the survival of older social structures, such as the warrior class, within a capitalist economy (Furuya 2002, 128). This theory, in connection with strategic considerations and the quest for modernity and recognition seems to explain the attitude of early Japan's leaders towards imperialistic expansion more thoroughly than the rest (Chang 2003, 259). In brief the reason was psychological and mental rather than based on definite factors and assessed considerations. Undeniably the function of Japan's first colony was connected to future strategic considerations (to serve as a bridgehead for further expansion against China) and to project a modern and potent Japan to the world. Initially though, it was colonized for the sake of colonization, emulating the Western powers. It was latent atavism, as Schumpeter put it; conquest, aggression, and effortless and predatory grabbing of foreign resources and lands. The widely and conventionally accepted theories on the demographic and economic factors as catalysts of overseas rule in the Age of Imperialism do not hold truth when it comes to early Japanese Taiwan.

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